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Abstract
This paper analyses the real eﬀects of Þnancial development subsequent
to Þnancial liberalisation in an economy with risk averse savers and learn-
ing by lending. Transition from full Þnancial repression to full Þnancial
liberalisation might initially slow down the growth process or even induce
a recession, whenever the initial level of valuable investments known by
the Þnancial instutions (informed capital) is suﬃciently scanty. However,
lending activity leads to accumulation of information (learning by lending)
regarding valuable investments. This way, as intermediaries become ex-
perts, the allocative eﬃciency they are able to guarantee ameliorates so
that, in the long run, the eﬀects of Þnancial liberalisation are eventually
positive.
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1. introduction
In the last 30 years the analysis of the growth eﬀects of Þnancial repression, and
more generally of Þnancial underdevelopment has become a crucial issue on the
agenda of researchers and policy makers. The dominant view dates back to Mck-
innon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and suggests that Þnancial repression is bad for
growth since it worsen both quantity and quality of investment. This accustomed
proposition has been generally conÞrmed by more recent literature on Þnancial
development and growth.1 Cross sectional econometric studies, like those of Jose
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), King and Levine (1993) and Roubini and Sala-
i-Martin (1992) are to a large extent supportive of the leading view in so far
they show that measures of Þnancial repression are negatively correlated with
subsequent growth rates. These Þndings are consistent with other cross sectional
econometric analyses on Þnance and growth showing that measures of Þnancial
development tend to be positively correlated with subsequent growth, see for
instance King and Levine (1993a, b).2 Yet, there is additional evidence which
points to a negative relationship between Þnancial liberalisation and growth. For
instance, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) show that in the case of Latin Ameri-
can countries Þnancial development, as measured by the ratio between domestic
credit to the private sector and GDP, is signiÞcantly negatively correlated with
subsequent growth.3 This is consistent with Xu (2000) who shows that 14 out
of the 41 countries in his sample exhibit negative long-term cumulative eﬀects
of permanent Þnancial development on economic growth. Interestingly enough,
the number of countries displaying negative eﬀects declines as the level of eco-
nomic development increases suggesting that the growth eﬀects of Þnancial devel-
1Khan (2001), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), King and Levine (1993), Saint-Paul (1993),
Bencivenga and Smith (1992), Levine (1991), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), are key examples
of this strand of literature. Excellent surveys on the topic are those by Levine (1997) and Pagano
(1993).
2Note however that as pointed out by Rajan and Zingales (1997) cross country regression
do not oﬀer solid insights about causality. Moreover, as discussed by Ram (1999) cross country
samples are likely to be characterised by huge parametric heterogeneity across countries, which
cast doubts on the legitimacy of conclusions drawn about subgroups of countries on the basis
of full sample statistics.
3According to their interpretation this Þnding might [..] reßect the eﬀects of experiments
of extreme liberalisation of Þnancial markets followed by their collapse [..] (De Gregorio and
Guidotti, page 443).
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opment change depending on the conditions of the real sector of the economy.4
Fry (1995) brings historical examples where Þnancial liberalisation has failed to
boost economic growth and argues that: [..](developing countries) have made
various changes in the structure and operations of their Þnancial systems under
the rubric of Þnancial development, Þnancial liberalisation, or reform. The ex-
perience of these eﬀorts has been disappointing in the extreme [..], [Fry (1995),
page 452]. In Frys view, if the Þnancial sector rapidly expands after Þnancial
liberalisation this might worsen the allocative eﬃciency of the Þnancial institu-
tions. Among the possible causes, one is that [..] there are likely to be acute
shortages of trained personnel in the Þnancial sector [..] and, [..] obviously
expertise cannot be acquired overnight [..] (Fry 1995, page 454). A similar point
is raised by Blanchard et al. (1992) who in their discussion about the reforming
of east European countries argue that [..]  the building of both competence and
expertise in banking is nearly by essence a process of learning by doing that takes
years [..], (Blanchard et al, 1992, page 78).
We reckon that in reality transitions caused by reforms develop according to
many factors. Yet, the point we develop in this paper is that, even abstract-
ing from those other factors, possible temporary slowdowns/recessions induced
by Þnancial development fostered by Þnancial liberalisation can be explained as
the result of a transformation process in which an old system of production is
abandoned for a new and untried one. The basic idea is similar to the concept
of transformational recessions (or slowdowns) applied by Blanchard et al (1992,
1997) in the analysis of East European Countries.
As Þnancial liberalisation triggers Þnancial development the economy moves
from an initial situation in which Þnancial institutions play little role to new
equilibria in which Þnancial institutions can be key to the allocation of Þnancial
resources. Financial development ensures risk pooling and mobilisation of savings.
Correspondingly, a larger set of investment opportunities becomes feasible and
attractive to savers. The result should be that Þnancial resources are allocated
toward more productive investments. However, this crucially depends upon the
4Furthermore, econometric evidence of a negative relationship between Þnance and growth
in the case of low-grow, or medium-grow economies, is found by Ram (1999) in a cross sectional
study. In our view the possibility of a non monotonic relationship between Þnance and growth is
a candidate explanation of why Demetriades and Hussein (1996) fail to Þnd robust cointegration
between Þnancial deepening and the level of economic development in one third of the developing
countries in their sample. Indeed, Demetriades and Hussein argue that the evidence they reach
provides [..] little support to the view that Þnance is a leading sector in the process of economic
development [..]; (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996, page 385).
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ability of the Þnancial sector to identify the valuable investment opportunities. In
a world in which information about investments quality is imperfect, such ability
is, at least partly, the outcome of a learning by lending process through which
Þnancial institutions accumulate relevant knowledge, i.e. information capital. Yet,
in Þnancially repressed economies, the active role of the Þnancial system in the
allocation of credit is reduced or virtually absent. Hence, Þnancial institutions
tend to have low expertise, i.e. the level of information capital tends to be low,5
which jeopardies the allocative eﬃciency that can be guaranteed by the Þnancial
system, at least soon after liberalisation. The argument then is that, at least in the
early stages, the gains associated with the transition process might be not strong
enough to compensate for the productivity losses associated with the dismantling
of the old production system.
To investigate this idea we build a simple OLG model with risk-averse individ-
uals, in which Þnancial liberalisation, inducing saving mobilisation, allows both
for risk diversiÞcation and the adoption of a more productive industrial tech-
nology which requires an initially high level of investment. Production can be
run by industrial Þrms or by individual simple Þrms. Information about Þrms
quality is fully observed by third investors one period after investment. Under
these premises, we consider two extreme regimes: full Þnancial repression and
full Þnancial liberalisation. Under the Þrst regime, there are no Þnancial trans-
actions. Each individual is engaged in self-production and carries all associated
risks which cannot be diversiÞed in any way. Under the second regime, funds
can be intermediated by the Þnancial sector. Within this set up we show that
the Þnancial system emerging because of Þnancial liberalisation could still oﬀer a
higher safe return than the certainty equivalent savers would get under Þnancial
repression, thereby attracting savings, even in cases in which the overall produc-
tivity of Þnanced investment is, due to the poor allocation achieved by the non
expert intermediaries, lower than that under Þnancial repression. Correspond-
ingly, Þnancial development sparked oﬀ by Þnancial liberalisation can be initially
detrimental for growth so that, in the early stages, the transition process might
be characterised by a slowdown or even a recession.
The key to this result is that Þnancial intermediaries ameliorate risk diver-
5In some extreme cases of Þnancial repression as those of the EE countries under the prereform
regime, the level of information capital was almost zero. As Calvo and Coricelli (1996) note,
[..] The information capital necessary for the functioning of credit markets and the concomitant
banking skills were absent in the Þnancial regime. Moreover, private credit markets did not exist
in highly centralized economies [..]. Indeed, in the prereform regime banks mainly served the
role of accounting Þrms [..], (Calvo and Coricelli, 1996, page 75).
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siÞcation. The literature on Þnance and growth has often identiÞed the provi-
sion of better diversiÞcation opportunities as one of the reasons why Þnancial
intermediaries improve the allocation of Þnancial resources, thereby enhancing
productivity of investments. Indeed, this intuition has been formally modelled
by various authors like, for instance, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Saint-Paul
(1993) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). Our result calls attention to the
reverse possibility. The provision of risk diversiÞcation here justiÞes why after
Þnancial liberalisation, Þnancial institutions might start playing a central role in
the allocation of Þnancial resources even though, being not learned enough, they
are ineﬃcient to such an extent that they are actually detrimental for growth.
Other studies, like for instance, Devereux and Smith (1994) and ObstÞeld (1994)
have shown that risk diversiÞcation might retard growth when it aﬀect adversely
the propensity to save. This result is obviously fundamentally diﬀerent from the
one we propose here as it relies entirely on the income and substitution eﬀects
induced by risk-diversiÞcation. Indeed, in our model, the fact that Þnancial insti-
tutions improve risk-diversiÞcation justiÞes the development of growth-harming
Þnancial institutions independently of the eﬀects on individuals propensity to
save.6
In the model, Þnancial institutions are able to accumulate information about
valuable Þrms through lending activity. Accordingly, as the credit market starts
playing a central role in the allocation of savings, this induces a process of accumu-
lation of information capital which ameliorates the allocative eﬃciency achieved
by the credit market so that at some stage Þnancial liberalisation would eventually
start bringing positive growth eﬀects. Therefore, the model we propose predicts
a relationship between Þnancial development triggered by Þnancial liberalisation
and economic growth which might be possibly non monotonic, i.e. negative in the
early stages of the transition process, and positive later on.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 solves the model in case of full Þnancial repression. Section 4 analyses the
impact of Þnancial liberalisation focusing both on immediate consequences and
ultimate long run eﬀects. A last section is left for conclusions.
6As it becomes clearer from the description of the model, we assume that agents, who live
for two periods, derive utility only from second period consumption, and therefore always save




The economy consists of a continuum sizeH of individuals and atomistic inÞnitely
lived industrial Þrms. The population of individuals as a standard OLG structure
with individuals living for two periods. Individuals have identical preferences
and derive utility from consumption in the second period of life according to
Ut = c
1−ρ
2,t , where, for each member of generation t, c2,t is the consumption level in
the second period of life, and ρ is a given parameter greater than zero. Each young
individual is endowed with one unit of labour which s/he supplies inelastically to
producers earning a salary wt in her/is Þrst period of life. Given individuals
preferences, the salary is entirely saved to Þnance consumption in the second
period.7 Production is carried out by industrial Þrms, and/or simple Þrms set up
by individuals. All Þrms are perfectly competitive. Individuals invest directly in
production or Þnance industrial Þrms investment activity via the credit market.
Newly set Þrms, both simple and industrial, are of type G with probability λ
and of type B with probability 1 − λ. Type B never makes to become mature
and able to produce while type G always manage. Mature Þrms live for ever. In
the case of simple Þrms, those that are mature at time t are inherited by young
individuals of generation t.
Accumulation of capital requires 1 period and we assume full capital depre-
ciation. Therefore, in every period, Kt+1 = It holds. The technology used in
production by mature Þrms is of two types: a cottage technology and an indus-
trial one. The latter is available only to industrial Þrms. The cottage technology
combines labour, l, and capital, Kt, according to yt = x(φ)Kαt l
1−αAt, where
At = (kt)1−α, with kt = Kt/l; where yt is the level of production, x(φ) is a nor-
mally distributed stochastic productivity shock, with expected value equal to φ
and variance V ar(x(φ)) = σ2. Note that the assumption of normality is tenable
as long as, given φ and σ2, the probability attached to negative realisations of
x(φ) is negligible, so that x(φ) takes virtually only positive values, i.e. the mass
of Þrms experiencing negative productivity tends to zero.8 The realisation of x(φ)
7While the adopted assumptions concerning the structure of preferences and the related
saving/consumption decisions are not strictly necessary to any of the main results of the model,
they allow for a great deal of simpliÞcation in the analytical solution of the model, and therefore
they help obtaining clear cut results.
8The assumption of normality is needed only in order to legitimate the concept of certain
equivalent straightaway, when analysing saving choices. Alternatively we could assume that x(φ)
is distributed identically and independently across Þrms, and is such that its higher moments
are negligible compared to σ2 so that the use of the certainty equivalent would be legitimate
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is known one period after investment. Returns to capital associated to cottage
production are not veriÞable. We further assume that the cottage technology is
subject to a maximum feasible scale of physical capital to produce at time t + 1
is Kt+1 = kMt, where k is a positive constant and Mt is the state of technical
knowledge at time t. Moreover, we assume that a fraction p of mature simple
Þrms can be converted to become industrial Þrms able to operate the industrial
technology.
The industrial technology entails yt = v(ψ)K
β
t l
1−βAt where At = (kt)1−β, with
kt = Kt/l, = where v(.) has the same properties of x(.), with E(v(ψ)) = ψ,
and V ar(v(ψ)) = σ2. Diﬀerently from cottage production returns to capital
in industrial production are perfectly veriÞable, while, similarly to the cottage
technology, we assume that the industrial technology is subject to a maximum
feasible scale of physical capital to produce at time t + 1 is Kt+1 = KMt, with
K > k. We also assume that the industrial technology has a minimum feasible
scale Kmint+1 > wt so that individuals inheriting a simple Þrm which could be
converted to industrial production cannot do so unless they have access to external
Þnance.
Technical knowledgeMt is assumed to be a public good, and accumulates over
time according to Mt = max{Mt−1Gt,Mt−1}, where Gt is the mass of successful
Þrms at time t. According to this speciÞcation, technology is a by-product of
production activity.9
3. Growth under Þnancial repression
In the real world, Þnancial repression comes under various forms such as ceilings
on deposit or lending interest rates, loan size ceilings, reserve requirements and so
on.10 As far as we are concerned here, the main consequence of Þnancial repression
as an approximation. Finally, the use of the certain equivalent could be legitimate also if we
were to assume a quadratic utility function. We adopted a CRRA speciÞcation to simplify the
exposition of the key results of our model.
9We would like to stress here that the models main results do not hinge on the speciÞc
assumptions introduced regarding Þrms technology. The only crucial assumptions which are
needed are: i) The existence of constant aggregate returns to capital accumulation, which
implies long run growth; ii) The fact that the size of Þrms is bounded from above so that the
Þnancial system cannot always place all resources in successful Þrms, which provides a rationale
for funding newly operating Þrms.
10These are few example of the possible forms types of discriminatory taxation imposed on
the Þnancial system. For a systematic discussion of the issue see Fry (1995).
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is to [..] reduce the overall availability of loanable funds to investors [..], Fry
(1995, page 38). Consequently, we model Þnancial repression as the extreme
case in which Þnancial transactions are totally prevented.11 It is worth noting
that, in the model we present, such a situation would indeed by generated as an
equilibrium as long as the interest rate ceiling on loans (or deposits) imposed by
the authority is lower than the certainty equivalent associated with self-Þnancing
cottage production.12 If Þnancial transactions are totally prevented, production
is undertaken directly by individuals who self-Þnance simple Þrms.13 Note that,
since we assume that, in each period, wt < Kmint+1 holds, under Þnancial repression
individuals have only access to the cottage technology even though their Þrm
might possibly be converted to industrial production if there is suﬃcient funding.
Recalling that newly set Þrms are successful with probability λ in their Þrst period
of life and that once successful in one period they will be successful in every other
period, the number of mature simple Þrms operating in the economy at time t+1
is
Gt+1 = Gt + λ[H −Gt],
where Gt is the number of mature Þrms at period t. The above equation implies
a unique stable steady state G∗FR = H. In steady state, then, each individual
inherits a successful simple Þrm. Individual savings at time t are given by wt =
yt(1−α). Since we assume that wt < Kt+1 holds for all t, it follows that individuals
invest all their savings. Finally, considering that productivity, x(φ), is i.i.d across
Þrms with E(x(φ)) = φ, aggregate product at time t + 1 is given by Yt+1 =
H(1−α)ytφ, so that, since Yt = Hyt, the steady state growth rate of the economy
11This is a standard assumption in the literature on Þnancial development and economic
growth. For instance, Pagano and Jappelli (1994) use this assumption to model the stage of
development of consumption credit. Another example is Bencivenga and Smith (1991) who
compare the equilibria of the economy with and without Þnancial transactions respectively, in
order to assess the growth impact of Þnancial development. We note that in their model, the
dominant equilibrium generated by market forces is one with Þnancial transactions. Conse-
quently, the only tenable justiÞcation for their absence is the existence of regulations which
prevent them.
12Given our assumptions the expected utility derived from the uncertain return to self-
Þnancing is equal to the utility attached to its certain equivalent. Therefore, as long as loans
pay an interest rate lower than the certain equivalent to the return on self-Þnancing agents never
engage in Þnancial transactions.
13Fry (1995) points out that credit shortage induced by Þnancial repression encourages low
yielding self-Þnanced investment.
8
is g∗FR = (1−α)φ−1. Finally we note that in steady state the certainty equivalent
to the return on self-investment is Rc
∗
= Rc∗ = αφ(1− ρα2σ2/2).14
For simplicity, in the following of the paper we study the eﬀects of the endoge-
nous transition toward industrial production supported by Þnancial development
sprung by Þnancial liberalisation, under the hypothesis that the Þnancially re-
pressed economy is operating at steady state.15
4. Credit market under full Þnancial liberalisation
Suppose that internal Þnancial markets are fully liberalised so that Þnancial trans-
actions can freely take place. For instance, we could assume that the authority
abolishes the interest rate ceilings which might be the determinant of the Þnancial
autarky equilibrium which characterises the Þnancially repressed economy.
The speciÞc shape the Þnancial sector of the liberalised economy takes depends
on the assumptions about the lending ability of individuals. In particular, if we
assume that all agents have the ability to process the information available in
the economy about lending opportunities, then Þnancial transitions could either
occur directly between savers and investors, or through intermediaries. Under
these circumstances the Þnancial sector cannot be uniquely deÞned. If, on the
other hand, we postulate that processing information relevant for lending requires
some skills peculiar to speciÞc institutions, namely Þnancial intermediaries, then
savings would be intermediated by these institutions which issue deposit contracts
and fund Þrms via loan contracts. As long as we assume that in both cases, the
credit market retains a perfectly competitive structure, the above issue is, at
least for the purposes of this work, not particularly relevant.16 In fact, under
the hypothesis of perfect competition both cases lead to the same result in terms
of allocation of funds and (therefore) returns to savers. Having said that, for
14 In steady state, all young individual inherit a mature Þrm. Therefore, they know that
by self-Þnancing their simple Þrm they will be surely able to produce. Yet, according to our
assumptions, productivity is a stochastic variable,x(φ), so that, in equilibrium, also the return
to capital αx(φ) is uncertain, with E(αx(φ)) = αφ, and V ar(α = x(φ)) = α2σ2. Given agents
preferences, then, the certainty equivalent to αx(φ) is given by Rc∗ = αφ(1− ρα2σ2/2).
15The eﬀects of Þnancial liberalisation are qualitatively similar in the case the Þnancial re-
pressed economy has not reached the steady state G∗ = H.
16 If we assume the existence of intermediaries this requires that are not tied up to the bank
which discover them so that accumulation information provides no rents and the credit market
operates in a perfect competition fashion. We note that this is the case in our model since
exp-post returns to investment in the industrial technology are fully veriÞable.
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expositional convenience we stick to the interpretation according to which the
link between savers and investors is guaranteed by Þnancial intermediaries, which
we simply call banks.
Since returns to cottage technology are not veriÞable, banks fund only indus-
trial Þrms. At the time (T ) Þnancial liberalisation takes place, there are pG∗RF ≡
GT simple mature Þrms suitable for conversion to industrial production. We note
that as long as the intermediary will guarantee a return RdT higher than the cer-
tainty equivalent to self-Þnancing the cottage technology, Rc∗ = αφ(1−ρα2σ2/2),
individuals will Þnd it convenient to diversify risk saving via deposits oﬀered by
the bank. Unknown industrial Þrms oﬀer an expected return λαψ. The GT ma-
ture Þrms converted to industrial production oﬀer an expected return αψ. Since
banks operate under perfect competition and face zero costs, all returns are re-
distributed to depositors. Therefore as long as λαψ is greater than Rc, savers will
Þnd it convenient to save in form of deposits. If so, all savings are channelled
toward banks. In turns, under these premises, banks will have incentive to max-
imise the level of funding channelled toward the GT existing mature industrial
Þrms. The maximum amount of investment in the GT Þrms is KT+1GT , which
also measures the maximum level of investment in known valuable opportunities
at time T , i.e. the level of informed capital at time T . The overall mass of Þrms
that can be funded at period T is DT /KT+1. As long as DT /KT+1 > GT banks
also engage in lending to infant industrial Þrms whose probability of success is
therefore λ.
Since the size of the loan allocated to each Þrm is KT+1, the mass of successful
Þrms at period T + 1 will be given by
GT+1 = GT + λ[DT /KT+1 −GT ].
Note that the banks know that all the GT+1 Þrms (successful at time T + 1)
will be successful at period T + 2 as well as in any other period with probability
1. The new level of informed capital at period T + 1 will be therefore equal to
GT+1KT+2. As it will become clearer later on in the discussion, the equation for
GT+1 shows a process of learning by lending according to which lending activity
results in accumulation of informed capital.17 Note that the interest rate on




αψ(1− λ) + λαψ
17A similar learning structure is presented by Lee (1996) although in this model the level of
information capital does not have any impact oneconomic growth.
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where GTKT+1/DT is the ratio between the level of informed capital and deposits.
Note that the interest rate is a growing function of GTKT+1/DT reßecting the fact
that the more informed are intermediaries the higher is their allocative eﬃciency,
with minimum value λαψ for GT , maximum value for GTKT+1 = DT .
4.1. Immediate growth eﬀects of liberalisation
According to previous analysis, provided that the condition λ ≥ Rc∗/αψ holds, all
savings ßow (in form of deposits) toward industrial Þrms production via interme-
diaries. Assuming that the level of per capita income at time T is YT the mass of
deposits will beDT = (1−α)YT . AssumingGT < DT/KT+1, the mass of successful
Þrms at period T + 1 is given by GT+1 = GT + λ[(1− α)YT/KT+1 −GT ]. Corre-
spondingly, the aggregate level of income at time T + 1 is YT+1 = GT+1KT+1ψ.
Hence, the growth rate initially induced by Þnancial liberalisation will be equal
to
gT = ψθT (1− λ) + (1− α)ψλ− 1
where θT = GTKT+1/YT is the ratio between the level of investment in Þrms
successful at the time of transition and the level of income, and can be thought
of as a measure of the level of informed capital at time T relative to the level of
economy activity. Note that the growth rate reaches its maximum, (1− α)ψ, for
GTKT+1 = DT , and its minimum, λ(1− α)ψ, for θT = 0.
A crucial question is whether this growth rate is greater or lower than that
associated with Þnancial repression provided that the condition λ ≥ Rc∗/αψ,
necessary for all savings to ßow toward industrial Þrms via intermediaries, holds.
Comparison between g∗FR and gT yields:





alisation leads to industrial production with ambiguous immediate growth
eﬀects. For values of the stock of information capital relative to the level of
economic activity, θT , lower than a critical level θ
∗, the growth rate gT , is
initially lower than the steady state growth rate under Þnancial repression,
g∗FR, while the opposite is true for θT > θ
∗. ii) For λ > φ/ψ, Þnancial
liberalisation yields unambiguously positive immediate growth eﬀects inde-
pendently of the level of θT .
Proof of Proposition 1. The growth rate under Þnancial autarky is (1−α)φ−1.




FR ⇒ θT < (>)
(1− α)[φ− λψ]
ψ(1− λ) ≡ θ
∗
Note that θ∗ > 0 holds for λ < φ/ψ. Since θT = GTKT+1/YT is always greater or
equal to zero, it then follows that, according to the above inequality, the growth
rate under Þnancial intermediation might possibly be lower than under Þnancial
repression if and only if θ∗ is positive which implies that the condition λ < φ/ψ
has to hold (otherwise gT is surely greater than g∗FR, as stated in part ii of the
proposition). As we already know, the minimum value of λ compatible with an
equilibrium in which all savings are in form of deposits is equal to Rc/ψα. Since
Rc = αφ(1−σ2α2ρ/2), it then follows that as long as ρ > 0, Rc/ψα < φ/ψ follows,
so that there exist values of λ such that λ ∈ [Rc/αψ,φ/ψ]. For these values of λ
as a consequence of Þnancial liberalisation all savings ßow toward Þrm-production
with immediate negative eﬀects on growth.¥
Proposition 2 suggests that an economy which experiences positive growth
rates under Þnancial repression, might possibly face an immediate recession as a
consequence of Þnancial liberalisation:
Proposition 2. i) Given ρ > bρ ≡ [(1−α)φ2−1]





(1−α)ψ ), such that Þnancial liberalisation leads to industrial production
with an immediate recession eﬀect on the economy, as long as θT < θ
∗∗ ≡
[1− λ(1− α)ψ]/ψ(1− λ). ii) For λ > 1
(1−α)ψ , Þnancial liberalisation yields
always non negative growth rates irrespectively of the value of ρ. iii) For
values of ρ < bρ, Þnancial development induced by Þnancial liberalisation
induces always non negative growth rates irrespectively of the value of ρ.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given the expression for the growth at time T we have:
gT < 0⇔ θT < [1− λψ(1− α)]
(1− λ)ψ = θ
∗∗.
Note that θ∗∗ > 0 holds as long as λ < 1/(1−α)ψ. Since θT cannot be negative, it
then follows that Þnancial intermediation can have recessional eﬀects if and only
if λ < 1/(1 − α)ψ. Otherwise, as stated in part ii of the proposition, Þnancial
liberalisation yields always non negative growth rates. As we know from previous
discussion, in order for savings to ßow toward unknown Þrms λ > Rc∗/αψ has to
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hold. Finally Rc/αψ < 1/(1−α)ψ is satisÞed provided that ρ > bρ ≡ 2[(1−α)φ−1]
(1−α)α2σ2 ,
18




Þnancial development results always in non negative growth rates, see part iii of
the proposition. For these values of λ all savings ßow to Þrm-production, and this
results in a negative growth rate.¥
Discussion. Proposition 1 states that if the probability of success of new Þrms
λ is lower than φ
ψ
, Þnancing industrial production brings in a lower contribution
to per capita growth compared to self-investment in cottage production whenever
the level of information about valuable industrial investments relative to the level
of economic activity, measured by θT , is lower than some critical value θ
∗. Yet,
as long as λ ≥ Rc/αψ holds, individuals Þnd it convenient to save in the form of
deposits which are then channelled toward industrial production by the Þnancial
intermediaries and hence to industrial production, rather than engage in self-





in the event that the level of informed capital is suﬃciently low, there is a discrep-
ancy between the allocative choices made by the individuals, and the allocation
of savings that would guarantee the highest return to capital at the aggregate
level as well as the highest growth rate for the economy. The possibility of that
kind of inconsistency hinges on the circumstance that, under the hypothesis of
risk aversion, individual allocative choices are triggered by the goal of maximis-
ing the certainty equivalent of the return to savings, while the growth rate is
maximised if savings allocated toward the highest expected return investments.
Recall that the certainty equivalent in case of self-funding of investment activ-
ity is Rc∗ = αφ(1 − ρσ2α2/2), while the expression for the return on deposits is
RdT = θTαψ(1−λ)+λαψ. Suppose θT is equal to 0, so that RdT = λαψ follows. In
this case, the growth rate under Þnancial intermediation would be (1−α)ψλ− 1,
while the growth rate under Þnancial autarky would be (1− α)φ − 1. It can be
easily seen that, as long as agents are risk averse, λαψ > Rc∗ is compatible with
φ > λψ. That is, in the above example, deposits might guarantee a safe return
higher than the certainty equivalent to the return of self Þnanced investment even
though the expected return as well as the total average productivity of invest-
ments funded by intermediaries (social productivity of capital), respectively equal
to λαψ and λψ, are lower than those associated with self-Þnanced investment in
cottage Þrms. Correspondingly, the example shows a case in which agents saving
18Note that bρ is positive since we assume that (1− α)φ − 1, which is also the expression for
the steady state growth rate under Þnancial repression, is positive.
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choices adversely aﬀect the growth rate of the economy. It is worth noting that
the more agents are risk averse, the lower is the minimum level of return that
intermediaries have to guarantee in order to attract deposits.19 Since rates of
return on deposits is a function of investments productivity this also means that
the higher is the degree of risk aversion the lower is the minimum level of pro-
ductivity of investments that intermediaries should guarantee. Henceforth, the
higher is the risk aversion, the higher is the possibility that even very ineﬃcient
and growth detrimental Þnancial institutions are be able to attract deposits.
The literature on Þnance and growth often advocates risk management as one
of the key features which justiÞes why Þnancial intermediaries should guarantee
that funds are channelled toward most productive uses. These results call atten-
tion to the reverse possibility. The provision of risk diversiÞcation here justiÞes
why after Þnancial liberalisation, Þnancial institutions might start playing a cen-
tral role in the allocation of Þnancial resources even though, being not learned
enough, they are ineﬃcient to such an extent that they are actually detrimental
to the growth process.
Interestingly enough the critical value of informed capital, θ∗ varies negatively
with the probability of success λ and positively with φ − λψ. The higher is the
probability of success λ the less the expected productivity of investment funded
by intermediaries is aﬀected by their ability to identify successful Þrms. In other
words, the issue of information about which Þrms will be successful becomes less
relevant as the probability that a newly Þnanced Þrm will be successful increases.
On the contrary, Þnancial intermediaries expertise becomes a more crucial element
the higher is the expected productivity diﬀerence, φ − λψ, between investments
in already successful cottage Þrms and those in newly Þnanced industrial Þrms.20
The above discussion indicates why the level of expertise of intermediaries
is the crucial determinant of their eﬀects on growth. In the next section we
analyse how, as Þnancial institutions start playing a central allocative role, they
accumulate information about valuable investment opportunity via a process of
learning by lending through which they become more expert; and how this learning
process aﬀects the growth rate of the economy.
19This follows from the fact that the higher is the degree of risk aversion, measured by ρ,
the lower is certain equivalent to the return to self-Þnancing, R∗c, which constitutes the only
alternative to deposits.
20This, provided that φ−λψ > 0, otherwise Þnancial liberalisation always has always positive
growth eﬀects, independently of the initial level of expertise of intermediaries.
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4.2. Post-liberalisation phase: the eﬀects of learning by lending
In the post transition phase the mass of funded projects is given by YT+1(1 −
α)/KT+2, where KT+2 is the maximum size of physical capital embedded in a
Þrm at time T + 2. Period T + 2 income is given by YT+2 = GT+2KT+2ψ, where
GT+2 is the stock of successful Þrms at time T + 2. Since GT+2 = GT+1 + λ[(1−
α)YT+1/KT+2−GT+1], we can write YT+2 = ψKT+2[GT+1+λ[(1−α)YT+1/KT+2−
GT+1]. Assuming that GT > 1 so that MT+1 = max[MTGT+1,MT ] =MTGT+1, it
then follows directly from our assumptions that KT+2 = KT+1GT+1. Using this
equality together with YT+1 = ψKT+1GT+1, we can compute the growth rate at




= GT+1(1− λ) + λ(1− α)ψ − 1. (4.1)
We note that this growth rate is an increasing function of the stock of good Þrms
discovered at time T + 1. This reßects that the more information is available in
the market about good Þrms, the higher is the allocative eﬃciency achieved by the
Þnancial sector. The accumulation equation summarising the learning by lending
process in the post-transition phase can be written as:
GT+n+1 = GT+n(1− λ) + λ(1− α)ψ
= [GT+1 − (1− α)ψ](1− λ)n + (1− α)ψ.
so that, correspondingly, we have:
gT+n = [GT+1 − (1− α)ψ](1− λ)n−1 + (1− α)ψ − 1
In fact, it follows directly from the above expression that dgT+n+1/dn > 0 and
that gT+∞ = g∗(1 − α)ψ − 1, which directly implies that Þnancial liberalisation
yields ultimate positive growth eﬀects (recall that ψ > φ).
Proposition 1 and 2 suggest that Þnancial liberalisation might initially result
in a slowdown of the growth process. However, the above analysis leads to
the conclusion that, as long as ψ > φ21 the ultimate growth eﬀects of Þnancial
liberalisation are positive. By playing a central role in the allocation of savings
21We recall that if this condition is not satisÞed, funds will never ßow toward industrial
production.
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Þnancial institutions maturate expertise which ultimately enables them to pro-
mote a more eﬃcient allocation of Þnancial resources than the one feasible under
Þnancial repression.
An interesting question concerns the length of the slowdown phase which might
possibly characterise the economy in the early stages after liberalisation. Similarly
one could ask about the length of the recession phase which might possibly be
triggered by Þnancial liberalisation. Given the expressions for the growth rate of
the economy before and after Þnancial liberalisation we have:
Proposition 3. In the post-transition phase, the following is true: i) For any




), the growth rate under Þnancial repression is higher (lower)
than the growth rate n periods after Þnancial liberalisation, gT+n, for n <
(>)max{0, int[n∗]}, where n∗ = log{(1−α)[φ−ψ]/[GT+1−(1−α)ψ])
log(1−λ) − 1. ii) Pro-
vided that λ is lower than φ/ψ, the growth rate n periods after transition






Proof of Proposition 3. Comparison with Þnancial autarky yields:
gT+n < (>)gFA ⇒ GT+n < (>)(1− α)[φ− λψ]
(1− λ) ≡ G.
Similarly to proposition 1 we note that: i) the gT+n can be lower than g∗FR if
and only if λ < φ/ψ holds; ii) All savings are channelled to industrial production
if and only if λ > Rc∗/αψ. Then, as long as Rc/αψ is lower than φ/ψ, which





such that under Þnancial liberalisation, only industrial production is being funded
while the economy suﬀers lower growth rates than under Þnancial repression until
Gt+n reaches the value G. Then, we recall that, for n ≥ 1, GT+n can be expressed
as:
GT+n = [GT+1 − (1− α)ψ][(1− λ)n−1 + (1− α)ψ − 1.
Comparing this expression with G we have:
GT+n < G⇔ (1− λ)n−1 < (1− α)[φ− ψ]
[GT+1 − (1− α)ψ]
We note that the RHS of this inequality is positive if and only if the initial value
GT+1 is lower than its steady state level (1− α)ψ, which in turns is always true
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provided the initial level of information GT is lower than the same steady state
value. Provided this condition is satisÞed, it can be identiÞed a value of n∗ such
that for t > (<)T + max{0, int[n∗]} full Þnancial development yields positive




log(1− λ) − 1
Note that there exist values of the relevant parameters such that n∗ > 1 holds.
This concludes part i. As for part ii we know that the economy experiences a
recession as a consequence of Þnancial liberalisation as long as gT+n < 1. Given
the expression for the growth rate at time T + n we have:
gT+n+1 < 1⇔ [GT+1 − (1− α)ψ][(1− λ)]n + (1− α)ψ < 1,





log[(1− λ)] ≡ n
∗∗.
It is easy to verify that for some combinations of the relevant parameters, n∗ > 1
holds. Note that if GT+1 = 0, the expression reduces to log(1− 1(1−α)ψ )/ log(1−λ).
This expression has a value greater than 1, so that a recession occurs at least at
time T + 1, if and only if λ < 1
(1−α)ψ . A conÞrmation of this comes from the fact
that if GT+1 = 0, the growth rate gT+1 is equal to λ(1− α)ψ which is negative if
and only if the above condition is satisÞed.¥
Discussion. Proposition 1 and 2 suggest that, depending on the level of initial
knowledge about good Þrms, full Þnancial liberalisation might induce an immedi-
ate slowdown of the growth process or even a recession. Proposition 3 suggests
that recessions and slowdowns are temporary phenomena, although they might
persist for a long time. As intermediaries gain expertise this ameliorates their
allocative eﬃciency so that eventually Þnancial liberalisation results in higher
growth compared to Þnancial repression. Yet, the possibility of temporary ad-
verse growth eﬀects suggest that the generations closer to the transition period
might suﬀer a welfare loss from a full liberalisation policy. For instance if at time
T , the growth rate is lower than it would have been under Þnancial repression,
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with Þnancial liberalisaiton individuals born at time T+1 will earn lower salaries.
They would have been therefore surely better oﬀ if Þnancial liberalisation did not
take place at time T . On the other hand, later generations will surely gain from
an early liberalisation. In our view this is suggestive of the possibility, which we
leave for future research, of gradualist policies designed on the basis of the optimal
trade oﬀ between potential welfare losses of the earlier generations compared to
the welfare gains of future generations.
Under the hypothesis that both n∗, and n∗∗ are greater than or equal to 1,
the length of possible slowdowns and recessions depends on the parameters φ,ψ,
and λ in an interesting way. For instance, the lower is the expected productiv-
ity diﬀerence between industrial and cottage Þrms, ψ − φ, the higher would be
the length of possible slowdowns triggered by Þnancial liberalisation. Intuitively
enough, as long as industrial production does not guarantee substantial produc-
tivity gains, the ineﬃciency induced by initially incompetent Þnancial institutions
becomes relatively more important. Not only that, the level of expertise that insti-
tutions should reach in order to guarantee a more productive allocation of savings
than under Þnancial repression becomes higher. In other words, in environments
where the quality of investment opportunities feasible under Þnancial liberalisa-
tion is generally low, Þnancial institutions have to be comparatively more expert
in order to be growth conducive, than in cases in which the quality of invest-
ment opportunities is high. A similar reasoning explains why as the probability
of success of newly funded Þrms increases, the length of slowdowns with φ and
decreases with ψ. Slow down phases tend to be more persistent the lower is the
probability of success λ. A lower probability of success for newly funded Þrms
implies two things: i) it worsen the overall productivity of investment funded by
inexpert Þnancial institutions; ii) it slows the learning by lending process. Cor-
respondingly, uniformed Þnancial intermediaries will be more ineﬃcient the lower
is λ and moreover it will take them longer to develop expertise. Similar results
apply to the possibility of recessions which tend to be longer the lower are ψ and
λ. Finally, the length of both recessions and slowdowns is reduced as the initial
level of knowledge about valuable investment opportunities, GT+1, increases.
5. Conclusion
It is a general view in the literature that Þnancial liberalisation, by promoting
Þnancial development, could guarantee a better allocation of savings compared to
Þnancial repression, thereby inducing positive long run growth eﬀects whenever
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conditions for endogenous growth are satisÞed. Yet, many historical examples of
transition and developing economies show that while the existence of Þnancial
services is a precondition for economic development, in many instances, the Þnan-
cial institutions spontaneously generated by the market economy subsequently to
Þnancial liberalisation were not eﬃcient enough to promote growth. We presented
a theoretical model in which transformational recessions/slowdowns might occur
as, after Þnancial liberalisation, the economy moves toward the use of more pro-
ductive technologies while developing the Þnancial sector which guarantees the
necessary mobilisation of savings due to the fact that Þnancial institutions have a
suﬃciently scarce ability of identifying valuable investment opportunities. There-
fore, the model oﬀers a simple theoretical justiÞcation of why non growth inducing
Þnancial institutions might emerge at the early stages of the post-liberalisation
phase. We also show how as the credit market starts playing an active role in the
allocation of funds, Þnancial intermediaries acquire expertise in the form of infor-
mation about the quality of Þrms. This process of accumulation of information
ameliorates the allocative eﬃciency guaranteed by the credit market with positive
eﬀects on the growth rate of the economy. Via this mechanism, Þnancial liberal-
isation eventually yields positive eﬀects on the level of income as well as on the
growth rate of the economy, as the Þnancial institutions gain the suﬃcient level of
expertise. In our view these results are suggestive of further investigations on the
possibility of gradualist liberalisation policies taylored on the optimal trade oﬀ
between adverse welfare eﬀects of liberalisation for early young generations and
the correspondent welfare gains of later generations.
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